International conventions and treaties are among the most important formal sources of modern international law, also known as treaty sources. Although they are formally the most widespread and outgoing source of international law (which creates the application), they are neither the only nor the most authoritative source for the creation of rights and obligations under international law. For any study of the sources of international law, Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice is always the starting point, recognized as the final statement of the sources of international law. It reads: 1. The Court, which is responsible for adjudicating disputes submitted to it in accordance with international law, applies: (a) general or special international conventions establishing rules recognized by the States in dispute; (b) international practice as evidence of general practice recognized as law; (c) The general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; (d) Subject to article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most qualified publicists of various nations as instruments for determining the rule of law; 2. This provision shall not affect the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice to give judgment ex aequo et bono if the parties so agree. The essay should consider whether it is exhaustive to present in detail all the sources of international law. Or are there other sources? What are the other sources? And is there a hierarchy between them? In examining conceptual and various sources of international law, statements on the authority of conventions and treaties as sole sources of international law are also examined. The decisions of international and municipal courts and the publications of doctrine cannot be described as a source of law as such, but as a means of recognizing the law established in other sources. In practice, the International Court of Justice does not refer to domestic judgments, although it does refer to its previous jurisprudence. Even if the absence of short periods of time does not necessarily or in itself constitute an obstacle to the formation of a new rule of customary international law on the basis of an initially purely treaty rule, it would be essential that, within the period in question, however short, the practice of the State, including that of States whose interests are particularly affected, should have been both complete and almost uniform within the meaning of that provision; and, moreover, so as to indicate a general recognition of the legal or legal mandate.22 It is questionable whether there is a hierarchy of norms in international law, since such a hierarchy does not exist under Article 38 of the ICJ Statute. However, certain principles of international law are of paramount importance and must be respected by all States.
These rules have the status of jus cogens, i.e. mandatory norms from which no derogation may be made. Article 53 of the Vienna Convention recognizes the principle of jus cogens. It stipulates that a treaty that deviates from the doctrine of peremptory norms of international law is null and void. Three principles which must respect the rule of jus cogens are as follows: The formally recognized sources of international law are reflected in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (1). These sources are often presented separately, as in Article 38, but in practice they influence each other. Root and Phillimore regarded these principles as accepted rules in the domestic law of all civilized states, and Guggenheim strongly believed that paragraph (c) should be applied in this light.91 Oppenheim`s view, however, is preferable: “[t]he intention is to make references (p. 11). 35) empowers the Court to apply the general principles of local case-law, in particular private law, in so far as they are applicable to relations between States`92 The last part of this statement is significant. The courts have not adopted a mechanical system of borrowing under national law. On the contrary, they have used or adapted modes of general legal reasoning and comparative analogies to create a coherent set of rules applicable in international judicial proceedings.
It is difficult for State practice to generate the evolution of the rules of procedure and evidence as well as the substantive law that a court must apply. An international tribunal selects, processes and adapts elements of other developed systems. The result is a body of international law whose content has been influenced by domestic law, but which is still its own creation.93 General principles of law are difficult sources to identify, and many have already been agreed in treaties or are already considered customs. Principles are norms derived from national law or national law and accepted in the international order. We may, for example, regard the principles of good faith, the protection of legitimate expectations and acquired rights as general principles of law. The Court added that “even if such a custom had existed only between certain Latin American States, it could not be invoked against Peru, which, far from following its position, rejected it”.60 Other attempts to establish a local standard of practice before an international tribunal have also failed.61 Article 38(1)(b) of the ICJ Statute refers to: “International customs” as a source of international law, emphasizing the two requirements of state practice and the recognition of practice as obligatory or opinio juris sive necessitatis (usually abbreviated to opinio juris). In the case of asylum, the ICJ recognized the need for uniform and uniform customs. This is interpreted from Article 38(1)(b), which refers to international practice “as evidence of general practice recognized as law”. In the long run, a significant effect of non-participation in a legislative treaty is the impossibility of invoking its dispute settlement provisions: a dispute can only arise on the basis of a contract between the parties.
